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INTRODUCTION

In formulating this Article's title, the concept of grasping seemed
particularly on point for several reasons. First, many international trade
lawyers have conceptual difficulty grasping the nature and scope of
private legal interests in the use of water. Second, many water lawyers
have conceptual difficulty grasping the nature and scope of investor
protections under international trade agreements such as the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Then there are recent
efforts of private water users to secure recognition of entitlements to
water under international trade agreements. These efforts represent a
type of grasping as well.
Although the focus of this Article is on water entitlement claims
brought under NAFTA, the uncertain junction of water law and
international trade law is a question now being debated in many other
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international forums such as the World Trade Organization (WTO),' the
European Union,2 and the South African Development Community.3 The
question is also now an important focal point for academic work in the
field of international law, as evidenced by Oxford University Press' 2005
book FreshwaterandInternationalEconomic Law, a collection of essays
by leading international law scholars from around the world.4 The debate
over the scope of private interests in water under international law is
therefore global in nature and not limited to North America.
This Article begins by outlining the hydrologic and legal restraints to
private ownership of water resources. It then details the provisions of
NAFTA that pertain to private rights in water, and reports on two highprofile water entitlement cases that have arisen under NAFTA's foreign
investor protection regime. The piece concludes by observing that the
experience of United States of America (U.S.) federal courts with state
water law may provide a jurisprudential template to bring NAFTA into
alignment with existing domestic water law and international water
treaties.
I.

PRIVATE RIGHTS TO WATER: ELUSIVE BY NATURE AND LAW

NAFTA was approved by Canada, the United States, and Mexico in
1993 and went into effect on January 1, 1994.' The bulk of NAFTA's
provisions focus on the transnational trade in goods and products. Early
on, however, the NAFTA parties recognized that water did not fit neatly
within accepted notions of what constituted a good or product under
traditional trade law terminology. This recognition led the parties to issue
a joint statement in 1993 concerning NAFTA's application to water
resources (1993 NAFTA Statement).6
The 1993 NAFTA Statement provides:
The governments of Canada, the United States and Mexico, in order
to correct false interpretations, have agreed to state the following
jointly and publicly as Parties to... NAFTA:

1. See Mireille Cossy, Water Services at the WTO, in FRESH WATER AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Edith Brown Weiss, Laurence Boisson de Chazournes &
Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwlader eds., 2005).
2. See Andreas R. Ziegler, Water-Related Investment. A European Perspective, in
FRESH WATER AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 1.

3. Treaty of Southern African Development Community, Aug. 17 1992, 32 I.L.M. 116, 120
(1993). See also Salman M.A. Salman, Introductory Note to Southern African Development
Community, Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the Southern African Development
Community, Windhoek, Aug. 7, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 317 (2001).
4.

FRESH WATER AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 1.

5. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057,
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
6. 1993 Joint Statement of the Governments of Canada, Mexico and the United States,
availableat http://www.scics.gc.ca/cinfo99/83067000_e.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
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The NAFTA creates no rights to the natural water resources of
any Party to the Agreement.
Unless water, in any form, has entered into commerce and become
a good or product, it is not covered by the provisions of any trade
agreement including the NAFTA. And nothing in the NAFTA would
oblige any NAFTA party to either exploit its water for commercial
use, or to begin exporting water in any form. Water in its natural state
in lakes, rivers, reservoirs, aquifers, water basins and the like is not a
good or product, is not traded, and therefore is not and never has
been subject to the terms of any trade agreement.
International rights and obligations respecting water in its natural
state are contained in separate treaties and agreements negotiated for
that purpose. Examples are the United States-Canada Boundary
Waters Treaty of 1909 and the 1944 Boundary Waters Treaty between
Mexico and the United States.7
Following up on the reference to the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty
between Canada and the United States in the 1993 NAFTA Statement,
the International Joint Commission (IJC) issued its own statement in
2000 (2000 IJC Statement) which considered water rights not only under
NAFTA, but also under WTO agreements.8 The IJC is the binational
institution with primary responsibility for resolving disputes under the
1909 Boundary Waters Treaty.
The 2000 IJC Statement provides:
The Commission believes it is unlikely that water in its natural state
(e.g., in a lake, river, or aquifer) is included within the scope of any of
these trade agreements since it is not a product or good....
...NAFTA and the World Trade Organization agreements do
not constrain or affect the sovereign right of a government to decide
whether or not it will allow natural resources within its jurisdiction to
be exploited and, if a natural resource is allowed to be exploited, the
pace and manner of such exploitation.9
Within the NAFTA regime, we can therefore see that Canada,
Mexico, and the United States have long agreed that there is something
fundamentally different about water compared to other items that may
cross national boundaries-something that eludes and often precludes
traditional notions of private ownership. Although the 1993 NAFTA
Statement and the 2000 IJC Statement do not spell out exactly what it is
about water that warrants this special treatment, it may have to do with
certain characteristics that are somewhat unique to water.
7.
8.

Id.
INT'L JOINT COMM'N, PROTECTION OF THE WATERS OF THE GREAT LAKES: FINAL

REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES, Sec. 8

at http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/htmllfinalreport.html.
9. Id.

(2000), available
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First, there are peculiar hydrologic uncertainties and fluctuations
inherent with water resources. Precipitation and temperature levels
during any given period will affect how much water is stored as
snowpack, the amount of precipitation that remains as snowpack versus
the amount of precipitation that melts to become runoff that makes its
way into creeks, streams, rivers, and underground aquifers, when such
runoff occurs, and how much surface water is lost due to evaporation.
Second, the availability of a water resource for a particular party is
often contingent on how other parties divert the resource. If two parties
are withdrawing groundwater from the same underground aquifer, the
withdrawals of one party may affect the groundwater available to the
other party.' The same is true for surface water diversions by multiple
parties-reduction in instream flow caused by one diverter reduces the
remaining flow for other diverters and for instream uses and users (i.e.,
fisheries and fishermen)."
Finally, water has long been considered by most domestic legal
systems to be a resource that is public, or at least quasi-public."l As
Professor Michael Hanemann of the University of California, Berkeley
recently observed:
The public good nature of water .. has had a decisive influence on
the legal status of water. In Roman Law, and, subsequently, in
English and American common law, and to an extent in Civil Law
systems, flowing waters are treated as common to everyone (res
communis omnium), and are not capable of being owned. 3
A few local examples from California and the American West illustrate
the public or quasi-public domestic legal status of water resources.
The California Supreme Court's 1983 decision in NationalAudubon
Society v. Superior Court confirmed that all surface waters in the state

10. Urs Luterbacher & Ellen Weigandt, Sustainable Water Use in an International
Context, in FRESH WATER AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 1, at 14. The
authors provide several examples:
Flowing water, for example, cannot be treated as a separate commodity because it is
in a "constant state of diffusion" or of movement, and a precise unit thus cannot be
allocated to single individual. In the case of pools of underground water, property
rights can be defined as an area of land above them, but it will not be clear whether
the water really comes from the area below this surface because of the fluid nature of
the resource. Pumping from another area of land may in fact be extracting the water
underneath another owner's patch of ground.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
11. Id.
12. Robert W. Adler, The Law at the Water's Edge. Limits to "Ownership" of Aquatic
Ecosystems, in WET GROWTH: SHOULD WATER LAW CONTROL LAND USE? 208 (Craig

Anthony Arnold ed., 2005) ("For most purposes, the water is considered 'public' although we
dole out usufructuary rights if the exercise of those rights is consistent with the public welfare.").
13. W.M. Hanemann, The Economic Conception of Water, in WATER CRISIS: MYTH OR
REALITY (Peter P. Rogers et al. eds. 2006).
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are subject to the public trust doctrine. 4 The public trust doctrine
restricts the ability of the state of California-acting through its state
water board-to grant private entitlements to divert waters that
significantly impair the public's interest in maintaining adequate instream
flows. In setting aside a series of state agency permits allowing the city of
Los Angeles to divert waters away from Mono Lake, the court clarified
that "before state courts or state agencies approve water diversions they
should consider the effect of such diversions upon interests protected by
the public trust, and attempt, so far as feasible, to avoid or minimize any
harm to those interests."' 5
In June 2006, in the case of Allegretti & Co. v. Imperial County, the
California Court of Appeal rejected the argument that a county's
application of groundwater
anti-overdraft pumping restrictions
constituted a physical taking of a landowner's water under the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 6 A "physical taking" covered by
the Fifth Amendment entitles a property owner to "just compensation"
for the property taken. The court in Allegrettiheld:
[The] County's action with respect to Allegretti in the present caseimposition of a permit condition limiting the total quantity of
groundwater available for Allegretti's use-cannot be characterized
as or analogized to the kinds of permanent physical occupancies or
invasions sufficient to constitute a categorical physical taking. [The]
County did not physically encroach on Allegretti's property or aquifer
and did not require or authorize any 7encroachment; it did not
appropriate, impound or divert any water.1
In 2005, in the case of Klamath IrrigationDistrict v. United States,
the U.S. Court of Claims rejected a Fifth Amendment takings claim,
finding that the plaintiff's entitlement to divert water from the Klamath
River (located in California and Oregon) under contracts with the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation was subject to compliance with the habitat
protection provisions of the Federal Endangered Species Act. 8 The
Court of Claims held:
[T]he court is mindful that... this ruling may disappoint a number of
individuals who have long invested effort and expense in developing
their lands based upon the expectation that the waters of the Klamath
Basin would continue to flow, uninterrupted, for irrigation. But, those
expectations, no matter how understandable, do not give those
landowners any more property rights as against the United States,

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). See discussion infra text accompanying notes 71-78.
Id. at 712.
42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122 (Ct. App. 2006).
Id.at 130-31 (internal citations omitted).
67 Fed. Cl. 504 (2005). See discussion infra text accompanying notes 79-80.
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and the application of the Endangered Species Act, than they actually
obtained and possess1 9
In three recent California Court of Appeal decisions-Planning&
0
Conservation League v. California Department of Water Resources"
in
2000, Santa Clarita Organization for Planning & the Environment v.
County of Los Angeles' in 2003, and Vineyard Area Citizens for
2
Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordovi1
in 2005-the court
recognized a distinction between "wet water" and "paper water." These
three cases clarified that "wet water" is water supply that is actually and
physically available for diversion and use, while "paper water" are water
supply entitlements that are referenced in documents (such as delivery
contracts with California's State Water Project) but that do not in fact
exist due to hydrological realities, environmental restraints, or
uncompleted infrastructure. As the court in the Planning and
Conservation League case explained, State Water Project entitlements
represent nothing more than hopes, expectations, water futures or, as the
parties refer to them, "paper water." "Paper water always was an illusion.
'Entitlements' is a misnomer, for contractors surely cannot be entitled to
water nature refuses to provide or the body politic refuses to harvest,
23
store and deliver.
These domestic law conceptions of water provide the backdrop for
understanding the 1993 NAFTA Statement and the 2000 IJC Statement.
They explain the difficulty in applying standard notions of property,
ownership, and entitlement to alleged private claims to a specific quantity
of water.
II.

WATER AND INVESTMENT UNDER NAFTA CHAPTER 11

Chapter 11 of NAFTA is designed to protect foreign investors from
appropriation of their property by host nations. More specifically,
Chapter 11 prohibits a host nation from taking measures that are
"tantamount to nationalization or expropriation" of an "investment"
except on "payment of compensation" based on "fair market value."24
Foreign investors who believe that a host nation has taken such measures
may initiate binding arbitration proceedings that can result in an
enforceable damages award.' There is no requirement that a foreign

19. Id. at 540.
20. 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 173 (2000).
21. 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 186 (2003).
22. 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 596 (2005), rev'don othergrounds, 150 P.3d 709 (Cal. 2007).
23. 100 Cal. Rptr. at 190 n.7. For additional analysis of the Planning & Conservation
League decision, see Paul S. Kibel & Barry H. Epstein, Sprawl and Paper Water: A Reality
Check from the CaliforniaCourts, CAL. REAL PROP. J., Winter/Spring 2002, at 22-23.
24. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1110.
25. Id. art. 1120.
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investor first exhaust domestic legal remedies available in the host nation
before initiating a Chapter 11 claim.
Chapter 11's use of the term "investment," instead of the terms
"goods" or "products," makes for a confusing application to water
resources. 6 Although the 1993 NAFTA Statement provides that water
generally should not be considered a good or product for NAFTA
purposes, it does not directly address the question of how this
characterization might affect claims regarding an investment in water
brought pursuant to Chapter 11. More specifically, the 1993 NAFTA
Statement on water leaves open the possibility of claims regarding
investments in water that might exist independent of claims that water
itself is a good or product subject to private ownership. 7
Article 1139 of NAFTA attempts to offer some guidance on what
might be considered an investment for Chapter 11 purposes. Article
1139(g) provides that the term "investment" may include "real estate or
other property acquired in the expectation or used for the purpose of
economic benefit. ' 28 Yet given the body of domestic law establishing that
any private right "acquired" to use water is subject to significant
limitations, the definition provided in Article 1139(g) is not particularly
helpful when applied to water resources. It merely begs the underlying
question of whether, and if so to what extent, a private party can acquire
water as property.
Article 1139(h) of NAFTA similarly attempts to offer guidance by
providing that an investment may include "interests arising from the
commitment of capital or other resources in the territory of a Party to
economic activity in such territory. '29 As with the use of the term
"acquired" in Article 1139(g), the use of the term "interests" in this
context raises more questions than it answers when applied to water
resources. Once again, given the body of domestic law establishing that
any private interest to use water is subject to significant limitations, what
type of interest in water can a private party be said to possess?
Chapter 11's definition of "investor" in Article 1139 also provides
little help. This definition provides that an "investor of a Party" means a
"Party or state enterprise thereof, or a national or an enterprise of such
Party, that seeks to make, is making or has made an investment."3 As to
26. Id. art. 1139.
27. Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder & Edith Brown Weiss, International Investment
Rules and Water Learning from the NAFTA Experience, in FRESH WATER AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 1, at 267 ("Although the [1993 NAFTA]
Statement considers the link between water and free trade in goods, it neglects the question of
how the investment rules in Chapter 11 might affect the ability of a State to protect its water
resources.").
28. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1139(g).
29. Id.art. 1139(h).
30. Id.art. 1139.
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what constitutes an investment for purposes of determining who
constitutes an investor in the context of Chapter 11 claims involving
water resources, we are left again with the ambiguities of Article 1139's
definition of investment.
In light of the uncertain relationship between the 1993 NAFTA
Statement and Chapter 11, and the less-than-helpful water-related
definitions of "investment" provided in Article 1139 of NAFTA, it is not
surprising that disputes have arisen over Chapter l's application to
foreign investment appropriation claims involving water resources.
To date, there have been two NAFTA Chapter 11 cases where
claims regarding water resources have been front and center.
A.

Claim by California'sSun Belt againstCanada

Sun Belt Water Inc. (Sun Belt) is a California corporation created to
provide additional water supply to real estate developments in
California.31 In 1990, Sun Belt entered into a joint venture with Snowcap
Waters Limited (Snowcap), a company based in British Columbia,
Canada. 2 The joint venture called for the diversion of water from the
Fraser River in British Columbia. The bulk water exports would be
transported by retrofitted oil supertankers down the Pacific Coast to
33
California where Sun Belt would market the water.
In 1991 the government of British Columbia-concerned about the
impacts of these diversions and exports on instream flow, fishery
resources, and water quality-passed a temporary ban on bulk water
exports and refused to award Snowcap its requested permit.34 This ban
rendered the Snowcap-Sun Belt endeavor unviable.
Because Snowcap was a Canadian company and not a foreign
investor, it could not.use Chapter 11 against Canada. Over many years,
Sun Belt attempted unsuccessfully to reach a settlement with the
government of British Columbia, and then had its claim for damages
rejected by the Canadian courts. In 1998 Sun Belt filed a Chapter 11
claim against Canada alleging $10.5 billion in damages resulting from lost
profits, lost market access, and lost access to water resources.3 ' The Sun

31. Sun Belt Water Inc., Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter
11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement at 1-4, Sun Belt WaterInc. v, HerMajestythe
Queen, U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law (Nov. 27, 1998).
32. Id. at 6.
33. Id. at 7.
34. Id. at 8.
35. Sun Belt Water, Inc., Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter
11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, Sun Belt Water Inc. v. Her Majesty the
Queen, U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law (Oct. 12, 1999).
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Belt NAFTA claim has not yet proceeded to arbitration, and as of this
writing no final settlement has been reached.36
A November 2000 report commissioned by the North American
Commission for Environmental Cooperation in Montreal explained the
broader context for the dispute:
The Canadian government considers water in its natural state not a
good and therefore not subject to Canada's trade obligations.
Accordingly, it has proposed a limited form of ban on the export of
water from Canada's main watersheds.
Ambiguities about water in trade agreements have concerned
citizens and nongovernmental organizations in the Great Lakes and
St. Lawrence River basins because they have struggled since the early
1980s to prevent large alterations to basin water systems, such as
dams, large takings, erosion control projects, flow control structures,
and diversions of water from the basin. Ambiguities about water in
trade agreements threatened to make diversions, in the form of
tanker, pipeline, bulk export, and multiple scale removals and
consumptive uses impossible to prevent. . . .Given recent tribunal
decisions under NAFTA Chapter 11's investor-state dispute
mechanism, even non-discriminatory measures are open to
challenge."
Sun Belt's Chapter 11 claim, although unresolved, raises a
fundamental question. If the Canadian courts have already reviewed its
claim and determined that Sun Belt has no property interest entitling it to
compensation under Canadian law, should a NAFIFA Chapter 11 tribunal
defer to this domestic judicial determination? Chapter 11 does not
require that a foreign investor first exhaust domestic judicial remedies
before bringing a Chapter 11 claim. Nevertheless, the lack of a domestic
exhaustion requirement does not establish that a Chapter 11 tribunal can
or should disregard a previous domestic judicial ruling in the host county
that directly addressed the question of whether regulation of a specified
natural resource in a particular manner gave rise to a governmental duty
to compensate a particular party. The issue here is not so much whether a
previous domestic court ruling acts to deprive a NAFTA panel of
jurisdiction to consider a Chapter 11 claim. Rather, the issue is what
degree of deference a NAFITA panel owes a domestic court in the event

36.

PUB. CITIZEN & FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, NAFTA CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-TO-STATE

CASES 24 (2001) (on file with author).
37. Christine Elwell, NAFTA Effects on Water: Testing for NAFTA Effects in the Great
Lakes Basin 22-23, Presented at the North American Symposium on Understanding the
Linkages Between Trade and Environment (Oct. 11, 2000) (on file with author).
38. See discussion supra first paragraph of Section 11.
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that a Chapter 11 claimant's alleged property interest has already been
examined and ruled upon.
B.

Claim by Texas FarmersagainstMexico

The 1993 NAFTA Statement on water provides, "International
rights and obligations respecting water in its natural state are contained in
separate treaties and agreement negotiated for that purpose. Examples
are the United States-Canada 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty and the
1944 Boundary Waters Treaty between Mexico and the United States."39
To understand the Texans' Chapter 11 Rio Grande claim against
Mexico, 4 a brief review of the 1944 Waters Treaty is required.
The 1944 Waters Treaty between Mexico and the United States
established separate allocation regimes for the Colorado River and the
Rio Grande. 1 In the case of the Rio Grande, the two largest tributaries to
the river-the Rio Conchos and the Rio Bravo-have their headwaters in
northern Mexico. Therefore, the Rio Grande allocation regime set forth
in the 1944 Waters Treaty obligates Mexico to allow certain flows to
reach the United States. A converse regime was established under the
1944 Waters Treaty for the Colorado, which flows from the United States
to Mexico, which calls upon the United States to release certain flows.
The 1944 Waters Treaty allocated to the United States one-third of
the flow of the tributaries in Mexico that reach the Rio Grande. 2 Except
in times of "extraordinary drought," this one-third allocation is not to be
less than 350,000 acre feet (AF) annually, averaged over a five-year
period.4 3 If the five-year period averages less than 350,000 AF due to
drought conditions, then Mexico is left with a "water debt."' 44 Under the
terms of the treaty, Mexico must pay back an accumulated "water debt"
in the next five-year period through increased releases. 5 The 1944 Waters
Treaty is silent as to the specific timeframe or schedule for making these
increased releases, and the agreement is also silent about what happens if
extraordinary drought conditions occur in back-to-back five-year
periods.46

39. 1993 NAFTA Statement, supra note 6.
40. For more detailed discussion of the Rio Grande NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute, see Paul
Stanton Kibel & Jonathan Schutz, Rio Grande Designs: Texans' NAFTA Water Claim Against
Mexico, BERKELEY J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2007).

41. Treaty Relating to the Utilization of Waters of Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the
Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219.
42. Id. at 1226-27.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1224-28.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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Under the 1944 Waters Treaty, the bilateral institution entrusted
with overseeing the allocation regime for both the Colorado River and
the Rio Grande is the International Boundary and Waters Commission
(1B WC). 47 In the 1992-1997 five-year period, and then again in the 19972002 period, Mexico did not provide an annual average of 350,000 AF.48
Mexico maintained that drought conditions prevented it from making
these deliveries. At the end of the 1997-2002 five-year cycle, Mexico had
accumulated a 1.3 million AF water debt.4 9 With assistance from the
IBWC, in March 2005 the United States and Mexico agreed on a schedule
for Mexico to discharge its Rio Grande water debt through additional
releases.5 °
Although the United States government was satisfied with this
resolution, a collection of farming irrigation districts in Texas (Texas
farmers) were not. These Texas farmers initiated a NAFTA Chapter 11
claim against Mexico in late 2004, seeking close to $700 million in
damages. 5' The thrust of the Texas farmers' Chapter 11 claim is that they
had and continue to have a legal entitlement to the minimum 350,000 AF,
and that Mexico appropriated this entitlement by failing to provide this
quantity. The Texas farmers argued that Mexico improperly relied on the
treaty's drought conditions exception. 2
The Rio Grande NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute involves more than
conflicting views of the scope and nature of the Texas farmers' property
interest in water. The dispute also raises the preliminary question of
whether the IBWC dispute resolution process provided for in the 1944
Waters Treaty deprives a NAFTA Chapter 11 panel of jurisdiction over
the Texas farmers' claim. Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, entitled "Application of successive treaties to the same

47. Id. at 1222-25, 1234-35.
48. Bayview Irrigation Dist., Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under
Section B, Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, Bayview IrrigationDist.,
et al v. United Mexican States (Aug. 24, 2004) [hereinafter Texans' NOI] (on file with author).
See Paul Krza, Texas Water Case is Takings on Steroids,HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Feb. 21, 2005).
49. Int'l Boundary Waters Comm'n, Update on Hydrologic, Climatologic, Storage and
Runoff Data for the United States in the Mexican Portion of the Rio Grande Basin: Oct. 1992Sept. 2001, at 3 (Apr. 2002).
50. Press Release, U.S. Section of the Int'l Boundary & Water Comm'n (USIBWC),
USIBWC Commissioners Announce Resolution of Mexico's Rio Grande Water Debt (Mar. 10,
2005) (on file with author).
51. Texans' NOI, supra note 48; Bayview Irrigation Dist., et al., Request for Arbitration
Under the Rules Governing for the Administration of Proceeding by the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes and the North American Free Trade Agreement,
Bayview IrrigationDist., et al. v. United Mexican States (Feb. 1, 2005) [hereinafter Texans'
available at http://naftaclaims.comlDisputes/MexicolTexas/
Request for Arbitration],
TexasClaimsNOA-19-01-05.pdf.
52. Texans' Request for Arbitration, supra note 51, at 6-7
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subject matter," 13 suggests that NAFTA's dispute resolution procedures
should govern. Article 30(3) provides in pertinent part, "When all the
parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the
earlier treaty is not suspended or terminated ... the earlier treaty applies
only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the
later treaty. 5 4 Application of this provision suggests that since Mexico
and the United States are both parties to the earlier 1944 Waters Treaty
and to the later NAFTA, the provisions of NAFTA should govern in the
event of a conflict between the two treaties.
However, other considerations of international law point to an
alternative conclusion. First, the primary focus of the 1944 Water Treaty
is on the allocation of river resources, whereas the primary focus of
NAFTA Chapter 11 is on private investment. Therefore, it could be
argued that the two treaties do not in fact relate to the "same subject
matter" and that Article 30(3) of the Vienna Convention is therefore
inapplicable."
Second, Article 31(a) of the Vienna Convention provides that "[t]he
context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text ... any agreement relating to the treaty which was
made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the
treaty."56 The 1993 NAFTA Statement, approved by both Mexico and the
United States, declared, "International rights and obligations respecting
water in its natural state are contained in separate treaties and
agreements negotiated for that purpose. Examples are the United StatesCanada Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 and the 1944 Waters Treaty
between Mexico and the United States."5 7 To the extent the 1993
NAFTA Statement falls within the scope of Article 31(a) of the Vienna
Convention, it suggests that NAFTA was not intended to displace or
replace the terms-including the dispute resolution terms-of the 1944
Waters Treaty.
Finally, another rule of treaty interpretation under customary
international law, lex specialis,holds that a more specific treaty or treaty
provision should prevail over a more general treaty or treaty provision."
Given that the 1944 Waters Treaty relates specifically to the question of
Rio Grande allocations between Mexico and the United States, and given

53. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc A/CONF. 39.27,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (emphasis added).
54. Id.
55. Chris Wold, Multilateral EnvironmentalAgreements and Trade Rules. Conflict and
Resolution, 26 ENVTL. L. 841, 910-11 (1996).
56. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 53.
57. 1993 NAFTA Statement, supra note 6.
58. CHRIS WOLD, SANFORD GAINES & GREG BLOCK, TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
LAW AND POLICY 676 (2005).
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that NAFTA Chapter 11 relates to the more general question of
appropriation of foreign investments, lex specialis would dictate that the
dispute resolution provisions of the 1944 Waters Treaty should prevail
over the dispute resolution provisions of NAFTA when allocation of the
Rio Grande is at issue.
To provide a sense of the opposing positions in this case on both the
jurisdictional and property interest questions, below are excerpts from
the opening briefs submitted to the NAFFA Rio Grande tribunal in the
summer of 2006.
1.

Briefing Submitted by Governmentof Mexico

On the question of the NAFTA tribunal's jurisdiction over the
dispute, the government of Mexico stated:
The claim is outside the scope of NAFTA by reason of the nature of
the treaty: The breaches of NAFTA alleged by the claimants are
based exclusively on the argument that Mexico breached obligations
established in the Treaty Between the United States of America and
Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana
Rivers and of the Rio Grande entered into by Mexico and the United
States in 1944.
The Bilateral Water Treaty has its own dispute settlement
mechanism, which can only be invoked by Mexico and the United
States.59

[Tihe Water Treaty of 1944 .
jurisdiction.'

.

.

grants the [IBWC] exclusive

On the question of the issue of "ownership" of the alleged
investment, the Government of Mexico maintained:
[N]one of the claimants even argue that they have a property right in
Mexico, whether in land, water or any other assets. [Mexico's]
Secretariat of Economy requested that they present a copy of the
property title or other documents that proves that each one has a
direct or indirect ownership or control of the investment allegedly
affect. None of the claimants did so.61

59. Memorial on Jurisdiction Submitted by United Mexican States at 2, Before the
Honorable Tribunal Established Pursuant to Chapter XI of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, Bayview IrrigationDist.et al v. United Mexican States (Apr. 19, 2006) (on file with
author).
60. Id. at 37.
61. Id. at 16 (footnotes omitted).
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None of the systems, facilities, and infrastructure that they allege to
own is located in Mexican territory; all are located in the United
States.62
[Alt a more basic level, if the claimants are located in the United
States and are subject to U.S. jurisdiction, specifically, to that of the
State of Texas, it is perplexing at best to wonder how they can
simultaneously be subject to Mexican jurisdiction ... or how it is that
Mexico could have expropriated a property right created by foreign
legal system and existing only in another country. 63
2.

Briefing Submitted by Texas Farmers

On the question of whether the IBWC has exclusive jurisdiction over
the matter, to the exclusion of the NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal, the
Texas farmers argued:
The fact that Mexico may have breached a treaty obligation [under
the 1944 Waters Treaty] owed to the United States does not
immunize it from the separate consequences of a violation of Chapter
11 of NAFTA. Simply put, this arbitration is about national
treatment, the minimum standard of treatment, and expropriation
and compensation, resulting from Mexico's seizure of water owned by
Claimants. As investors, Claimants have the right to pursue this claim
for Respondent's adoption of measures relating to their investment,
and this Tribunal has jurisdiction over this claim.'
On the question of ownership of water interests, the Texas farmers
contended:
Claimants are the legal owners of 1,219,521 acre-feet of the irrigation
water wrongfully withheld and diverted from the Rio Grande by
Mexico's manipulation of its dams and reservoirs as of October 2002.
These water rights, as well as delivery facilities, irrigation works,
farms, equipment, and irrigated farming businesses of which they are
an essential element, form an integrated investment, the
expropriation and diversion of which has severely damaged the ability
of Claimants to produce crops.65

62. Id. at 30.
63. Id. at 34.
64. Counter-Memorial of Bayview Irrigation District et al. in Support of Jurisdiction at 44,
In the Arbitration Between Bayview Irrigation District et al. v. United Mexican States (June 23,
2006) (on file with author).
65. Id. at 7-8.
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Claimants' expectations to the right to the receipt of use of the water
at issue in these claims were fixed by the [1944] Treaty Between the
United States of America and Mexico.... 66
On the question of the applicability of the 1993 NAFTA Statement
to water, the Texas farmers maintained:
Since Claimants' water, which flows within courses of the six abovenamed Mexican tributaries before reaching the Rio Grande, where it
is stored in Falcon and Amistad reservoirs, sold on the Water Market,
and delivered through a complex of irrigation works, is clearly a good
or product in commerce, it necessarily falls within the scope of
NAFTA.6 7
The reference by the Texas farmers to "reservoirs" in support of
their argument that the Rio Grande water should be considered a "good"
or "product" under the 1993 NAFTLA Statement on water is particularly
interesting given that the 1993 NAFTA Statement specifically provides:
"Water in its natural state in lakes, rivers, reservoirs, aquifers, water
basins and the like is not a good or product, is not traded, and therefore is
not and never has been subject to the terms of any trade agreement. "68
So far, Mexico has persevered in its opposition to the Texas farmers
claim for compensation. However, given the ambiguous status of water
under NAFIFA Chapter 11, there are risks to Mexico in taking this hard
line. As Kyla Tienhaara from the Institute for Environmental Studies at
Vrije University in Amsterdam observed in a November 2006 article in
GlobalEnvironmentalPoliticsThe uncertainty created by the current framework for investor-state
dispute settlement, coupled with the high cost associated with
arbitration proceedings, can leave governments in developing
countries in a precarious position. When faced with a decision on
whether to risk millions of dollars for an unknown outcome, many
countries may opt instead to retract, amend or fail to enforce an
environmental regulation.69

66. Id. at 1.
67. Id.at 25.
68. 1993 NAFTA Statement, supra note 6 (emphasis added). The Merriam-Webster
Dictionary defines a "reservoir" as "an artificial lake where water is collected and kept in
quantity for use." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY (11th ed. 2003) (emphasis
added). To the extent the Texas farmers contend that water stored in a "reservoir" is not "water
in a natural state," this interpretation would appear to render the inclusion of the word
"reservoir" in the 1993 NAFTA Statement nonsensical since a reservoir is by definition an
artificial man-made impoundment (as opposed to a naturally occurring aquifer or lake).
69. Kyla Tienhaara, What You Don't Know Can Hurt You. Investor-State Disputes and
the Protectionof the Environment in Developing Countries, GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., Nov. 2006,
at 73, 96.
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These are considerations that may well factor in to Mexico's future
calculations of whether to curtail water deliveries to the United States for
domestic Mexican water resource conservation and environmental
objectives.
Ill. REACHING INCOMPETENCE

Stepping back from the particulars of the Rio Grande and Sun Belt
NAFTA Chapter 11 claims, what is so intriguing about these disputes is
the way claimants are advancing private property notions of water that
are contrary to domestic water law.
In domestic water law, the past several decades have seen an
increase in the legal recognition of the public interest in water resources.
Fishery habitat protection for endangered species, the public trust
doctrine, instream flow requirements, and the wet water/paper water
distinction are all elements of this domestic water law trajectory."
Yet within the framework of multilateral investment treaties such as
NAFI'A's Chapter 11, we are now confronted with efforts to recharacterize water resources as quantitatively fixed private property. If
these efforts are successful, we will be left with a fundamental disconnect
and divergence between domestic water law and international trade law.
This disconnect and divergence have the potential not only to impact
public regulation of water resources but also to erode support for the
current trade agenda.
If progress is to be made in bringing NAFITA Chapter 11-and,
potentially, other foreign investor protection regimes-into closer
alignment with domestic law notions of the private interest in water, an
analytic framework for such reconciliation can be found in the domestic
litigation leading up to the California Supreme Court's 1983 decision in
7
NationalAudubon.
" The court held that California's public trust doctrine
applies to instream waters, and that this doctrine imposes an obligation
on California agencies to limit the private interest in diversion of such
waters to avoid and minimize adverse public impacts.72 The path by which
the underlying litigation in National Audubon made its way into the
California courts may provide instructive lessons for NAFTA Chapter 11
tribunals.

70. See Brian E. Gray, The UncertainFuture of Water Rights in California:Reflections on
the Governors' Commission Report, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 43, 46-47 (2005). See generally
David R.E. Aladjem, Innovation within a Regulatory Framework: The Protection of Instream
Beneficial Uses of Water in California, 1978 to 2004, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 305 (2005);
Harrison C. Dunning, CaliforniaInstream Flow ProtectionLaw: Then andNow, 36 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 363 (2005).
71. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
72. Id. at 712.
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The environmental plaintiffs in National Audubon filed their initial
lawsuit in May 1979 in Mono County Superior Court against the
Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles (DWP)
The case was then transferred to Alpine County Superior Court.74 In
January 1980, DWP cross-complained against several other parties,
including the United States federal government.75 Upon being named, the
United States removed the case from state court to the federal district
court for the Eastern District of California.76 However, because certain
California water law questions were central to the plaintiffs' claims and
DWP's defenses, Federal District Court Judge Lawrence Kramer sent
these questions back to the California courts for resolution.77 As the
California Supreme Court decision in NationalAudubonexplained:
[T]he district court stayed its proceedings under the federal
abstention doctrine to allow resolution by the California courts of [an]
important issue[] of California law .... What is the interrelationship
of the public trust doctrine and the California water rights system, in
the context of the right of the Los Angeles Department of Water and
Power ("Department") to divert water from Mono Lake pursuant to
permits and licenses issues under the California water rights system?
In other words, is the public trust doctrine in this context subsumed in
the California water rights system, or does it function independently
of that system? Stated differently, can the plaintiffs challenge the
Department's permits and licenses by arguing that those permits and
licenses are limited by the public trust doctrine, or must the plaintiffs
challenge the permits and licenses by arguing that the water
diversions and uses authorized thereunder are not "reasonable or
beneficial" as required under the California water rights system?78
In essence, Judge Kramer determined that since the public trust
doctrine was a matter of California law, the California courts should first
be provided with an opportunity to provide further clarification on the
scope of the doctrine before the federal courts took up the issue. The
U.S. Court of Claims adopted a similar approach in Klamath Irrigation
District v. United States.79 In Klamath Irrigation, Judge Allegra
concluded that federal courts need to take account of background
principles of state water law in reviewing claims alleging a property
interest in water, because otherwise the federal court result might be an

73. Id. at 716.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 716-17.
77. Id. at 717.
78. Id.
79. 67 Fed. CI. 504 (2005).
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award of compensation "for the taking of interests that may well not exist
under state law."8 )
In NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals' review of alleged private
investments in domestic water resources, a level of restraint similar to
that exercised by Judge Kramer in the NationalAudubon litigation and
Judge Allegra in the Klamath Irrigationdecision is warranted. To the
extent the existence and scope of an alleged property interest in water is
contingent on domestic water law, a NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal
considering this alleged interest needs to properly identify and reflect
such domestic water law. To the extent the existence and scope of an
alleged property interest in water is contingent on an international water
treaty, such as the 1944 Waters Treaty or the 1909 Boundary Waters
Treaty, a NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal considering this alleged interest
needs to properly identify and reflect the treaty.
In short, there are sound reasons for NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals
to abstain from taking upon themselves the task of interpreting water law
questions more appropriately answered by domestic courts or by dispute
resolution bodies (such as the IBWC) established under international
water treaties. To do otherwise will only evidence the potential of
NAFTA's foreign investor regime to reach into areas of domestic and
international natural resource law that are outside its competency.

80.

Id. at 538.

